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INTRODUCTION
Since 2009, the business pages of many major newspapers have been rife
with stories about insider trading. The name most often in the headline of
these stories is Preet Bharara, U.S Attorney for the Southern District of
New York.' Since taking on the job of fighting insider trading on a large
scale, he boasts a 78-1 record for convictions.2 However, one man has
evaded that scorecard even though his company and several employees
have earned criminal and civil convictions.
S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P. ("SAC") was once a $14-billion hedge
fund with one of Wall Street's best records for performance.3 Steven A.
Cohen, the owner and namesake of SAC, was the subject of admiring
profiles in everything from the New York Times4 to Vanity Fair.5 He was
1. See Meet the US. Attorney Preet Bharara, U. S. DEP'T JUSTICE, http://www.
justice.gov/usao/nys/meetattorney.html (last updated May 14,2015).
2. See Julia La Roche, Here's Preet Bharara's Amazing 79-0 Insider Trading
Conviction Score Card, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 6, 2014, 4:30pm),
http://www.businessinsider.com/bharara-insider-trading-convictions-2014-2 (stating
that the headline reports a 79-0 record but that the number has changed and will
continue to change to include more losses for Bharara because a federal appellate court
has held that the conduct an insider trading defendant was engaged in did not rise to the
level of criminal insider trading); see also United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d
Cir. 2014) (finding that the court reversed the conviction of hedge fund manager
Anthony Chiasson because the government had not established that Mr. Chiasson
actually knew that the information he was receiving from various networks was non-
public information and it also found that some of the information came from other
managers, brokers, and traders and that he would have no way of knowing if the
information was non-public. On the heels of this reversal, lawyers for many of the
other defendants were already working to have plea agreements set aside on the
grounds that the law was misunderstood at the time of the pleas); Matthew Goldstein &
Ben Protess, Some Accused of Insider Trading May Rethink Their Guilty Pleas, N.Y.
TIMES Dec. 12, 2014, at B3 (emphasizing that the case turned on the element of
scienter, or criminal intent).
3. Peter Lattman, SAC Capital to Try to Reassure Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
27, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/sac-to-hold-client-call-
amid-insider-trading-case/?_r-0.
4. Jenny Anderson et al., A Fascination of Wall St., and Investigators, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/23/business/steven-cohen-of-
sac-is-fascinating-to-investigators-too.html? r-0.
5. Christopher Bateman, Steve Cohen on Life, Love, His Art Collection, and Those
Pesky Insider-Trading Rumors, VANITY FAIR (June 2, 2010, 12:01am), http://www.va
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once number thirty-six on Forbes' list of richest Americans worth an
approximated $11 billion;6 Mr. Cohen was called "the king of hedge
funds."7 Mr. Cohen received attention for his art collection (valued at $1
billion) and his thirty-room mansion in Connecticut.8 However, as his
wealth and successes increased, there was attention building and many
questioned, "How does he do it?" The two questions that swirled around
SAC were: (1) How did the hedge fund outperform every other fund?; and
(2) Why were so many current and former SAC traders being indicted,
convicted, or entering guilty pleas for insider trading?
As a result of these questions, the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority ("FINRA") began making referrals to the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in 2010 for possible insider
trading by SAC. In July 2013, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") filed a
criminal indictment against SAC Capital.9
I. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FIRM'S INDICTMENT
SAC lawyers originally entered a not guilty plea to the charges.o
Employees and investors were sent an email saying that it would be
business as usual for SAC's 1000 employees and its offices in eight cities
around the world." Eventually, SAC's strategy would shift from complete
denial to acceptance as the company agreed to plead guilty to settle
criminal and civil charges.1 2 It is a rare move for federal prosecutors to
indict a corporation, but as of mid-July 2013 (the time of the charges),
SAC's main portfolio was up eleven percent when most hedge funds were
nityfair.com/online/daily/2010/06/steve-cohen-on-life-love-his-art-collection-and-
those-pesky-insider-trading-rumors.
6. The World's Billionaires Steve Cohen, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/
profile/steve-cohen/ (last updated June 18, 2015).
7. Bateman, supra note 5.
8. Julia La Roche, The Fabulous Life of Hedge Fund Legend Steven Cohen,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 7, 2012, 10:26 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-
fabulous-life-of-steve-cohen-2012-12?op=1.
9. United States v. SAC Capital Advisors LP, No. 13-cr-00541 para. 1,
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/SAC%20Indic
tment%20%28Stamped%29.pdf [hereinafter Indictment].
10. Bernard Vaughn, SAC Capital pleads not guilty to insider-trading charges,
REUTERS (July 26, 2013, 12:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/26/us-
sac-fund-charges-idUSBRE9600SD20130726.
11. Matthew Goldstein, SAC Capital CEO Steven Cohen Throws a Party Despite
Indictment, HUFFINGTON POST (July 28, 2013, 3:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/07/28/steven-cohen-party-despite-indictment_n_3667713.html.
12. Christopher M. Matthews, Judge Oks Guilty Plea in SAC Capital Insider-
Trading Case, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2014, 12:39 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com
/law/2014/04/1 0/judge-oks-guilty-plea-in-sac-capital-insider-trading-case/.
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up approximately 3.2 percent.' 3  As more individual traders from SAC
began to face individual criminal convictions and details of the pervasive
criminal corporate culture began to surface, it became clear the
investigation into SAC would continue.
In November 2013, there was an announcement of the settlement of the
SAC criminal charges. 14 The government outlined the terms. SAC agreed
to pay $900 million in forfeiture and a $900 million fine.' 5 The firm
received credit for a $616 million already paid to the SEC to settle civil
charges, bringing the total fine to just under $1.2 billion.1 6 SAC, and by
extension Mr. Cohen as the owner of the firm, agreed to pay the fine.' 7
However, Mr. Cohen was not charged criminally, and in statements
released after the settlement, SAC pointed the finger at a small group of
employees.' 8  He maintains that he bears no personal criminal
responsibility.' 9  Mr. Cohen wisely seized on the weakness that the
appellate court found in a previous case;20 that the government needs to
show that Mr. Cohen actually knew that the information his traders and
managers were using was nonpublic. 2 1 Again, since the traders and
managers gathered the information from different sources, including other
brokers, traders, and managers, that direct line to nonpublic information is
not easily established.
The case presents a series of unresolved legal questions about civil and
criminal liability of financial firms, how the two types of cases are
intertwined, and the role and culpability of firm leadership in these charges.
Bharara has alleged that the company is a "magnet for market cheaters."2 2
13. Goldstein, supra note 11.
14. Press Release, U.S. Dep't Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Guilty
Plea Agreement With SAC Capital Management Companies (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attomey-announces-guilty-plea-
agreement-sac-capital-management-companies.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Michael Rothfeld, SAC Agrees to Plead Guilty in Insider-Trading Settlement,
WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303482504579177
602847708162 (last updated Nov. 4, 2013, 10:03 PM).
19. Linette Lopez, Here's The 46-Page White Paper Steve Cohen Gave To SAC
Employees Yesterday Explaining Why He Didn't Do Anything Wrong, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Jul. 23, 2013, 2:12 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/cohen-sac-white-
paper-2013-7.
20. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
21. Id.
22. Julie Creswell, A Relentless Prosecutor's Crowning Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 25,
2013, 8:24 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/a-relentless-prosecutors-
crowning-case/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r-0.
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Is being a magnet for cheaters criminal activity? Can a culture that seems
to breed insider trading be a basis for criminal charges? The case against
SAC takes the firm's criminal culpability into uncharted waters.
Exploration of this potential criminal culpability and culture will begin
with a review of the history of SAC and Mr. Cohen with respect to
interactions with regulators. A summary of the insider trading cases
brought against former and current SAC employees will follow. Finally,
there is analysis of how and when activities and knowledge can be
attributed to firms for purposes of imposing criminal culpability and how
this has left Mr. Cohen seemingly untouchable.
II. A HISTORY OF FRAUD: COHEN'S LEGAL AND REGULATORY
INTERACTIONS
Mr. Cohen first drew the attention of regulators early in his career. In
1991, as a young trader, Mr. Cohen was censured by the New York Stock
Exchange and barred from trading for four weeks because he was alleged
to have made a trade that inflated the price of a stock in order to protect
him from losses.23 The result of the inflation trade was that his position
loss was cut in half. Mr. Cohen was terminated because of the trade, and
SAC was born. 2 4
Questions arose surrounding SAC, Mr. Cohen, and insider trading long
before the current criminal indictment of the corporation. For example, in
2003, Holly B. Becker, formerly of Lehman Brothers, was investigated by
the SEC for passing along advance information to her then husband, who
was a principal in SAC.25 There were indications that the trading positions
of Ms. Becker's husband coincided with the information he may have
received through advance copies of the reports, however, no charges were
ever filed.26
Almost twenty years later, accusations still abounded. Mr. Cohen's
former wife, Patricia Cohen, filed suit alleging that Mr. Cohen had made
$20 million in profit by trading in advance of General Electric's ("GE")
purchase of RCA Corporation based on an insider tip regarding the
acquisition that he had received in advance of the GE announcement.27
The case was peripheral to the couple's divorce, and no charges were ever
brought. 2 8 As these individual issues were percolating through innuendo,
23. Anderson et al., supra note 4.
24. Id.
25. Gretchen Morgenson, Analyst and Her Husband Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2003, at Cl.
26. See id; see also Anderson et al., supra note 4.
27. Anderson et al., supra note 4.
28. Id.
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general questions about SAC continued to emerge in the business press.
The "numbers" SAC achieved were labeled as "off the charts" and the
compensation paid to SAC employees as "unmatchable," and those in the
financial world sought to understand SAC's ability to defy market trends.29
Interest into what was going on behind closed doors only continued to
grow when individual former and current employees of the company began
to be systematically indicted.30
III. CRIMINAL CULPABILITY THROUGH ATTRIBUTION OF CULTURE AND
CONDUCT: WAS COMPLIANCE OR LACK OF COMPLIANCE A BASIS FOR
CRIMINAL LIABILITY?
The forty-one-page indictment against SAC alleged that the corporate
entities have
criminal responsibility for insider trading offenses committed by
numerous employees and made possible by institutional practices that
encouraged the widespread solicitation and use of illegal inside
information. Unlawful conduct by individual employees and an
institutional indifference to that unlawful conduct resulted in insider
trading that was substantial .. . [and] pervasive.3 1
A. Culture Factor One: Continuing Success Does Not Yield Scienter Even
When Results Defy Odds
Tying Mr. Cohen to SAC's misdeeds, however, was a challenge for the
federal government. SAC employees have noted that Mr. Cohen was not
32present at many of the compliance training sessions. In a 2011
deposition, Mr. Cohen said that he had read SAC's compliance model but
did not "remember exactly what it says."33 Although it seems clear to
many that Mr. Cohen was SAC and SAC was Mr. Cohen, finding him
personally responsible has been a difficult task. It seems clear that Mr.
Cohen may have tolerated, ignored, fostered, or otherwise allowed the
insider trading culture of SAC, but proof of actual knowledge of the details
of each trader's or manager's actions has been elusive. The distance
between the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and employees in actual
knowledge is great in these situations. An inkling that something nefarious
may be afoot does not scienter make.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Indictment, supra note 9 para. 1.
32. James B. Stewart, At SAC, Compliance with an Edge, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26,
2013, at Bl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/27/business/at-sac-rules-
compliance-with-an-edge.html.
3 3. Id.
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B. Culture Factor Two: The Compliance Component
Until 2008, SAC had a policy of purging all instant messages ("IMs")
after thirty-six hours and all emails not specifically saved after thirty days.
The indictment specified, that although the compliance department had
recommended reviewing electronic communications by employees, they
were "rarely reviewed." 34 However, SAC later boasted that it had a thirty-
eight employee compliance department, which was one of the "earliest,
most sophisticated, most expensive, and most far-reaching in the
industry." 3 5 The claims by SAC in touting its compliance operations to
investors was that those operations included the following:
'[D]aily reviews' of email and IMs; a 100% electronic retention policy;
restrictions on the use of expert networks; and even surveillance of
employee communications. It is true that most of these key compliance
measures were instituted after the trades that are the focus of the
indictments, but it also appears the were instituted before SAC became
aware of the current investigation.
The indictment alleged that, regardless of their relatively new
compliance policies, it has become clear that the culture fostered by SAC
produced "hundreds of millions of dollars of illegal profits and avoided
losses at the expense of members of the investing public."3 7 The issue is,
however, does sloppy compliance equal scienter? The indictment falls short
of tying the activities of the traders to Mr. Cohen thus attributing to him the
knowledge of ongoing and uncorrected criminal activity that is required for
executive and corporate criminal culpability.38
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") Assistant Director George
Venizelos said,
SAC [ . .. ] and its management fostered a culture of permissiveness.
SAC not only tolerated cheating, it encouraged it. According to the FBI,
the aim all along has been to root out the wrongdoers, and send a
message to anyone else inclined to break the law. If your information
'edge' is inside information, you can't trade on it.39
Ironically, Mr. Cohen said in a 2011 deposition that he found the law on
34. Indictment, supra note 9 para. 24.
35. Roger Parloff, USA v SAC A simply Unanswerable Indictment, FORTUNE (July
26, 2013, 6:08 PM), http://fortune.com/2013/07/26/usa-v-sac-a-simply-unanswerable-
indictment/.
36. Id.
37. But see id.
37. Indictment, supra note 9 para. 7.
38. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
39. Patricia Hurtado et al., SAC Capital Indicted for Unprecedented Insider
Trading Scam, BLOOMBERG (July 25, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
07-25/sac-capital-indicted-in-six-year-u-s-insider-probe.html.
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insider trading to be "very vague."40 It is difficult to find the records of
internal audits on questionable trades at SAC, and sanctions against traders
appear to be non-existent. Former SEC chairman, Harvey Pitt, who was a
speaker at SAC explained, "[m]y sense was that it was a check-the-box
mentality, not a serious commitment." 4 1
IV. THE SAC EMPLOYEES AND FORMER EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE BEEN
CHARGED WITH INSIDER TRADING
There is a "trail" of insider trading that surrounds SAC. Arguably,
investigators just follow where the facts lead them, and many insider
trading cases seem to lead back, in some way, to SAC through current or
former employees.42 This is evidence of the type of corporate culture
fostered at SAC in which using questionable means to obtain an "edge"
was commonplace.
The history of current and former SAC employees contains many who
were accused, and convicted, of insider trading. Those who have been
charged with insider trading with connections to SAC include Noah
Freeman, Donald Longueuil, Jon Horvath, Wesley Wang, Mathew
Martoma, Richard Choo-Beng Lee, and Michael Steinberg.4 3 Mr. Martoma
was found guilty on two counts of securities fraud and one count of
conspiracy, and he was sent to prison for nine years.44 Mr. Longueuil
pleaded guilty but did not assist in the investigation.45
Former portfolio manager, Mr. Lee, plead guilty to insider trading on
July 23, 2013, and he is cooperating with the investigation as are Mr.
46Freeman, Mr. Horvath, and Mr. Wang. Among the traders Mr. Lee
implicated was Richard Grodin who worked for SAC in the 1990s, and he
was able to provide the FBI with information about the culture of the
company, including the extensive use of expert networks.47 Bharara has
described the analysts and portfolio managers as maintaining a "tight-knit
circle of greed." 4 8
40. Stewart, supra note 32.
41. Id.
42. See Bryan Burrough & Bethany McLean, The Hunt for Steven Cohen, VANITY
FAIR (June 2013), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2013/06/steve-cohen-
insider-trading-case (detailing the history of investigations into insider trading with
multiple links to SAC through current or former employees).
43. Id.
44. Kevin McCoy, SAC Capital Trader Gets 9 Years, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 2014,
at 2B.
45. Hutardo et al., supra note 39.
46. Id.
47. See Burrough et al., supra note 42.
48. Hutardo et al., supra note 39.
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Although not named in the indictment, Mr. Cohen is alleged to have sold
his entire portfolio of $12.5 million in Dell Inc. ("Dell") after an insider tip
from Mr. Horvath. 4 9 This sell-off avoided losses of approximately $1.7
million.50 After Dell publically reported lesser earnings, Mr. Cohen sent an
email to Horvath that said "Nice job on Dell."' Mr. Cohen's lawyers say
that he never read that first email.52
V. THE SAC HIRING PROCESS
There are times when traders go south because of the culture of a firm,
but there are other times when traders have already gone south, and they
are hired precisely because of their sordid past. For example, one of the
young traders hired at SAC was Richard S. Lee, a 34-year-old trader who
was hired from Citadel, a Chicago-based hedge fund.
Mr. Lee was fired after one day on the job at Citadel because he signed
onto the company's accounting system and altered the value of his holdings
by $4.5 million.54 Citadel's accounting system caught the problem, and he
was terminated. Ordinarily, this type of behavior by a trader would mean
the end of a trader's career. No financial firm would want to risk having
such an individual anywhere near client's funds or its accounting systems.
SAC, on the other hand, was more than willing to hire someone whose
career was over by market standards. Despite warnings from both Citadel
(whose CEO had approved Lee's termination), as well as warning from
SAC's own legal team about the compliance risks of bringing Mr. Lee into
the firm, Mr. Lee was hired.5 Mr. Lee has disclosed that he emphasized his
reliance on expert networks in doing his job during his subsequent
49. Id.
50. Indictment, supra note 9, para. 32a.
51. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Steven A. Cohen with Failing to Supervise
Portfolio Managers and Prevent Insider Trading (July 19, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539726923#.U4yeOPI
dVqU (alleging that Steinberg replied, "Thanks ... this ole dog can still hunt."); see
also Sheelah Kolhatkar, Specter of Steven Cohen Haunts SAC Capital Portfolio
Manager's Trial, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3, 2013) http://www.businessweek.com/articles/
2013-12-03/specter-of-steven-cohen-haunts-sac-capital-portfolio-managers-trial.
52. See Katherine Burton, SAC's Cohen Doesn't Recall Dell E-Mail Cited in SEC
Order, BLOOMBERG (July 23, 2013, 5:20 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
07-23/sac-s-cohen-doesn-t-recall-dell-e-mail-cited-in-sec-order.html (alleging that
Cohen only opened approximately 11 percent of his email messages).
53. Hutardo et al., supra note 39.
54. Ben Protess & Peter Lattman, Trader's Hiring Offers a Glimpse of SAC
Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2013, at Al.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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interview with SAC. Mr. Lee was indicted for insider trading, has entered
a guilty plea, and has cooperated with the government on the SAC case.
Mr. Lee has indicated that federal authorities have sought his
cooperation by asking for information about the questions asked and
statements made during his hiring process. 59 When SAC was asked for
information about its hiring processes, it responded by indicating that it
does not take the hiring process lightly and that it has refused to hire some
individuals because of concerns about "compliance issues.,,60 However,
SAC has declined to give any examples of its refusal to hire someone
61because of compliance concerns.
Insider trading cases against six former SAC employees have shed light
on the expectations that came through the hiring process. Noah Freeman,
shortly after graduating from Harvard, joined SAC and has told the FBI
"that trafficking in corporate secrets was part of his job description at
SAC." 62 An FBI agent's notes on SAC include the following, "Freeman
and others at SAC Capital understood that providing Cohen with your best
trading ideas involved providing Cohen with inside information." 63
Bharara noted that the "indictment is not just a narrative of names and
numbers, it is more broadly an account of a firm with zero tolerance for
low returns but seemingly tremendous tolerance for questionable
conduct." 64
E-mails within SAC emphasize some interesting credentials of new
hires, including items such as the fact that a trader owned a share of a
house in the Hamptons with one company's CEO or that another was "tight
with management" of another company. 6 5 Education, former employers,
and achievements are generally the focus of circulated information about
new employees. However, at SAC, connections were touted as
qualifications for the job.
VI. TESTING THE EVIDENCE: THE CONVICTION OF MICHAEL STEINBERG
66Michael Steinberg was one of SAC's most senior portfolio managers.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Stewart, supra note 32.
61. Id.
62. Peter Lattman, Trail to a Hedge Fund, From a Cluster of Cases, N.Y. TiMEs,
Dec. 5, 2012, at Al.
63. Id.
64. Hurtado et al., supra note 39.
65. Stewart, supra note 32.
66. Nate Raymond & Matthew Goldstein, More Trouble for Cohen's SAC Capital
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He was close to Mr. Cohen, and the pair attended the same high school.67
Mr. Horvath worked under Mr. Steinberg and was tasked with researching
investments for him.6 8 Mr. Horvath testified in court that Mr. Steinberg
urged him to seek insider tips. In a meeting, Mr. Steinberg told Mr.
Horvath "What I need you to do is go out and get me edgy, proprietary
information that we can use to make money in these stocks."6 9 Mr.
Horvath explained that he took this as a push to go out and seek nonpublic
information.70
A jury convicted Mr. Steinberg in December 2013 of conspiracy and
securities fraud.71 He was found guilty of five counts related to illegal tips
on technology stocks provided by Mr. Horvath to bring in $1.4 million in
illegal profits to SAC.72 This was the first case in which federal
prosecutors attempted to convince a jury in a criminal proceeding that there
was enough evidence to prove insider trading at SAC.73 Mr. Steinberg
appeared to briefly faint after being convicted.74
On May 16, 2014, Mr. Steinberg was sentenced to forty-two months in
prison but remains at home awaiting the result of his appeal. 75  This
sentence length was considerably lower than the six and a half years sought
by prosecutors. Approximately, seventy character letters were submitted
on Mr. Steinberg's behalf for sentencing, and Justice Richard Sullivan
acknowledged the support. However, Justice Sullivan noted that -
The fact is you didn't need to commit these crimes . . . . There are very
indicted in NY, REUTERS (Mar. 29, 2013, 2:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article
/2013/03/29/us-sac-steinberg-insidertrading-idUSBRE92SO6020130329.
67. Sheelah Kolhatkar, Why SAC Capital's Steven Cohen Isn't in Jail,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-02/why-
sac-capitals-steven-cohen-isnt-in-jail#pl.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Patricia Hurtado, SAC Manager Guilty as Insider Focus Turns to Martoma,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 19, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-
18/sac-fund-manager-steinberg-guilty-in-insider-trading-case.html.
72. Id.
73. Christopher M. Matthews, SAC's Steinberg Convicted in Insider-Trading
Case, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl000142405270230477
3104579266554036539982 (last updated Dec. 18, 2013, 9:16 PM).
74. Agustino Fontevecchia, Preet Bharara Closing In On SAC's Steve Cohen After
Michael Steinberg Found Guilty OfInsider Trading, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2013, 6:25 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2013/12/18/preet-bhararas-insider-trading-
crusade-takes-down-ex-sac-trader-michael-steinberg-is-steve-cohen-next/.
75. Sheelah Kolhatkar, Former SAC Capital Manager Steinberg Sentenced to
Three and a Half Years, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 16, 2014),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-05-16/former-sac-capital-portfolio-
manager-steinberg-sentenced-to-3-dot-5-years (as of the time of this writing).
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few people in the history of mankind who've had all the material things
you had - not to mention the immaterial things, a family who loved you,
people who relied on you. There were lots of reasons not to engage in
this conduct. 76
Mr. Steinberg was also ordered to pay a $2 million fine and forfeit
approximately $365,000 gained through illegal trading.77
VII. BUILDING A BRIDGE TO COHEN: MATHEW MARTOMA'S CONVICTION
Mathew Martoma was, at one time, another high-ranking player at
78SAC. As noted, he was found guilty of insider trading in February 2014,
and his case is on appeal after receiving a nine-year sentence in September
2014.79 However, Mr. Martoma's insider trading allegations provide a
possible direct connection to Mr. Cohen himself. He was the only SAC
official connected, in criminal court, directly to Mr. Cohen prior to making
an illegal insider trade. This direct connection makes Mr. Martoma's
conviction extremely valuable to prosecutors.
Mr. Martoma received private information from Dr. Gilman, an
Alzheimer's expert at the University of Michigan. Dr. Gilman was
overseeing the clinical trial of the Alzheimer's drug, bapineuzumab.80 Two
weeks before the final drug results were due, Mr. Martoma spoke to Dr.
Gilman who told him the drugs were underperforming. 8  It could be
inferred that Mr. Martoma directly discussed this inside information with
Mr. Cohen during a twenty-minute phone conversation based on the fact
that SAC began purging its holdings in the companies associated with the
drug a day after the conversation took place. 82 The indictment alleges that
Mr. Cohen encouraged Mr. Martoma to speak with the doctor running the
clinical trials and took no action to determine whether the employees under
his supervision were engaged in unlawful conduct. 83  After this
76. Id.
77. Kevin McCoy, Ex-SAC Capital trader gets prison sentence, USA TODAY (May
16, 2014, 2:46 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/05/
16/michael-steinberg-sentencing/9091093/.
78. See Kolhatkar, supra note 67.
79. Bob Van Voris, SAC's Martoma Denied Bid to Remain Free in Insider Case,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Nov. 12, 2014, 12:06 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2014-11-12/steven-a-cohen-testimony-to-be-focus-of-martoma-appeal; see also
Kevin McCoy, Ex-SAC Capital trader gets 9-year sentence, USA TODAY (Sept. 8,
2014, 8:14 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/09/08/martoma-
sentencing-insider-trading/15148411/.
80. Kolhatkar, supra note 67.
8 1. Id.
82. Id.
83. In re Steven A. Cohen, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 3634, 2013 WL
3776681, para. 69 (July 19, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/ia-
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conversation with Mr. Cohen, SAC removed $700 million of investments
affected by these trials surrounding the pharmaceutical companies Elan and
Wyeth.84 Mr. Martoma's insider trading deals provided SAC with
approximately $275 million in illicit earnings.85
Mr. Martoma was drawn to SAC originally by a guarantee of specific
profits from his own portfolio and a portion of proceeds in the Cohen and
CR Intrinsic accounts. 86 This compensation package was a direct pathway
to money that no other hedge fund was offering. Mr. Martoma had a
biology degree from Duke. He had work experience at the National
Human Genome Research Institute, and he is married to a physician.88 This
background is what may have drawn him to pharmaceutical stocks.89
The year of the big pharmaceutical trade, Mr. Martoma was rewarded for
his suspicious conduct with a $9.3 million bonus. 90 In 2009 and 2010, Mr.
Martoma did not receive a bonus.9 He was subsequently fired in 2010 for
poor performance.92 In a 2010 email, which suggested that Mr. Martoma be
fired, a firm member wrote that Mr. Martoma was a "one trick pony." 93
This evaluation is some indication of the SAC culture; the rewards came
only for the large deals based on "edgy" information (at best). The
reprimands came for not replicating the same proficiency with other trades.
When Mr. Martoma was first approached by federal investigators after
allegations of insider trading, he fainted on his front lawn. 94 However, Mr.
Martoma's conviction has not had a profound effect on Mr. Cohen because
prosecutors at the U.S. Attorney's Office in Manhattan have not been able
to convince Mr. Martoma to provide them with enough information to
implicate Mr. Cohen personally.9 5
Turning on another executive in exchange for a more lenient sentence
3634.pdf [hereinafter SEC Proceeding].
84. Id. para. 82.
85. Id. para. 90.
86. Kolhatkar, supra note 67.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. SEC Proceeding, supra note 83, para. 91.
91. Id. para. 93.
92. Id. para. 94.
93. Id. para. 94.
94. E.g., Ausustino Fontevecchia, After Martoma's Insider Trading Conviction,
Will Preet Bharara Finally Go After Steve Cohen?, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2014, 6:30 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2014/02/06/after-martomas-insider-trading-
conviction-will-preet-bharara-finally-go-after-steve-cohen/.
95. Kolhatkar, supra note 67.
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has been a common occurrence on Wall Street.96  The Former Chief
Financial Officer ("CFO") of Enron, Andrew Fastow, received a more
lenient sentence in exchange for testifying against his superiors. Recent
insider trading cases featured similar exchanges with Anil Kumar testifying
against the Galleon Group Founder, Raj Rajaratnam, and Goldman Sachs
Board Member, Rajat Gupta.98 These cooperators plead guilty and avoided
trial in their exchange for a lesser sentence.99 The odds of Mr. Martoma
providing prosecutors with information regarding Mr. Cohen may now be
diminished because of the conviction, which may result in a reduced
incentive to cooperate.
As noted, Mr. Martoma was sentenced in September of 2014.100
Probation officials recommended eight years, while the federal sentencing
guidelines suggested somewhere between 15.6 and 19.7 years, the sentence
was for nine years.' 0 ' Mr. Martoma's lawyers asked for a more lenient
sentence considering his devotion to his family, his 100 support letters, and
his history of helping others.1 02 The judge went with the lesser figure for
what appeared to be consideration for his family.
VIII. WHY MR. MARTOMA WILL NOT TALK
Months before Mr. Martoma was fired he wrote an email to Mr. Cohen
that read,
SAC is a special place to me. Having attended graduate and
undergraduate programs at Harvard, Stanford and Duke; founded/sold
my own healthcare company; and worked as a Director at the largest
federally funded science initiative in the last 3 decades, I have a variety
of experiences to compare against my time at SAC[.]
He continued, "through it all, it's clear to me that I am in my element
here at SAC."0 3 These strong feelings towards SAC, and the hefty profits
made during his tenure, may provide some explanation for why Mr.
Martoma has stood firm in his refusal to provide information to the federal
96. See, Sheelah Kolhatkar, On the Trial of SAC Capital's Steven Cohen,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-
01-1 7/on-the-trail-of-sac-capitals-steven-cohen#p2.
97. Michael Bobelian, What Does Martoma's Conviction Mean For SAC Capital's
Steven Cohen?, FORBES (Feb. 7, 2014, 11:36 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
michaelbobelian/2014/02/07/what-does-martomas-conviction-mean-for-sac-capitals-
steven-cohen/.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. McCoy, supra note 77.
101. See id
102. Id.
103. Kolhatkar, supra note 67.
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prosecutors. Mr. Martoma was also able to rely on SAC to pay his legal
fees.1 04
The value of his testimony has also already been significantly
diminished by facts that came out in his own criminal trial. Convictions on
counts of fraud and conspiracy do not bolster his credibility.'o In the
course of his trial, it also became apparent that he was expelled from
Harvard Law School for falsifying his transcript when he applied for a
clerkship with a federal judge.'0 6  The end result was that the two SAC
employees with direct contact to Mr. Cohen, Mr. Martoma and Mr.
Steinberg, refused to cooperate with the government. 0 7 Business journalist
Robert Boxwell noted, "to police Wall Street, go after the little guys."'0 8
The hope was that the "little guys" would sing, but there is a loyalty here
that finds the little guys falling on their swords for the big fish.
The recent decision on insider trading will only increase this trend. The
decision has muddied the waters on scienter and put in place a standard that
requires a direct connection to an insider in order to establish criminal
securities fraud. The research networks that resulted in so many
indictments, pleas, and convictions are now a gray area of the law.
Second-hand information is not the stuff of insider trading. In Mr.
Martoma's case, even when the direct connection is established to the
physician/scientist, the trader was unwilling to implicate principals in the
firm in exchange for a lesser sentence.
IX. How COULD MR. COHEN BE HELD CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE MISDEEDS OF SAC?
Interestingly, prosecutor Bharara published an article on the liability of
corporate defendants in 2007.109 He traced the genesis of corporate liability
in the United States starting with the 1909 case of NY Central & Hudson
River Railroad Co. v. United States.o"0 That case focused on the concepts of
vicarious liability and respondeat superior, and the court concluded that
104. Sheelah Kolhatkar, A Novel Insider-Trading Defense? Any Defense at All,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/
2014-01-30/a-novel-insider-trading-defense-any-defense-at-all.
105. Massimo Calabresi, New Guilty Verdict Could Be Bad News For SAC
Capital's Steven Cohen, TIME (Feb. 6, 2014), http://time.com/5312/mathew-martoma-
sac-capital/.
106. Id.
107. Robert Boxwell, To police Wall Street, go after the little guys, REUTERS (May
16, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/05/16/to-police-wall-street-go-
after-the-little-guys/.
108. Id.
109. Parloff, supra note 35.
110. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
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"the action of an agent, while exercising the authority delegated to him to
make rates for transportation may be controlled in the interest of public
policy by imputing his act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the
corporation for which he is acting in the premises." 1 1' After discussing the
collective entity doctrine, Bharara concluded that "the corporation is
particularly ill equipped to defend itself, and certainly less well equipped
than the traditional individual defendant, against the power of prosecutors
to prove virtually any corporate entity guilty upon showing criminal
conduct on the part of at least one employee.""12
Bharara argued that there is a need to address overbroad corporate
liability standards." 3  In this case, a federal judge admonished the
government for coercing a company to interfere with its employee's
constitutional rights.11 4 The conduct was criticized because it allowed
prosecutors to use unjustifiably heavy-handed techniques to compel
corporations to cooperate in criminal investigations against their own
employees." 5
Bharara noted that corporations do not have the same ability to challenge
various information gathering techniques by the government.1 16 He
analyzes the Thompson and McNulty Memorandum which narrowed
prosecutor's criteria for charging corporate entities.l17 Prosecutors, under
this Memorandum, are required to weigh the company's corporate culture,
where criminal conduct is either discouraged or encouraged, and then it
assesses the adequacy of the compliance program." He discusses the
problems with this method, as prosecutors are not trained in corporate
governance problems and have a difficult task when it comes to assessing
the company's corporate culture." 9 Prosecutors in the SAC case have met
this challenge head on, unraveling the details of the corporate culture at
SAC and using discretion to issue charges.1 20 Bharara recommends that
111. Id. at 494.
112. Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul:
Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 53,
64-65, 71 (2007).
113. See Parloff, supra note 35.
114. Bharara, supra note 112, at 54.
115. Id. at n.64.
116. Id. at 65.
117. Id. at 112, memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General,
US Department of Justice, to Heads of Department Components, US Department of
Justice (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.justice.govsites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/07/05
/mcnultymemo.pdf [hereinafter "Thompson McNulty Memorandum"].
118. Id. at 112.
119. Id.atn.321.
120. See Parloff, supra note 35.
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corporate criminal liability be brought in line with "common sense and
common practice." Prosecutors are given sole discretion to evaluate the
factors set out in the Thompson and McNulty Memoranda when
considering a charge, and Bharara hypothesizes that a codified rule or
statute could shift some of this discretion to a judge or jury.1 2 2
Perhaps, it is the balance between long held beliefs in corporate liability
and prosecutorial discretion that prompted Bharara to pursue criminal
charges against SAC but not against Mr. Cohen. It is possible that with a
codified rule or statute, Mr. Cohen could have been charged, as less
discretion would lie in the hands of the prosecution.
X. THE DIFFICULTY IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER INSIDER TRADING
LAWS
The framework set out in Dirks v. SEC governs insider-trading
offences.1 23 Under this framework set out by the U.S. Supreme Court, a
tippee is liable for insider trading if the tipper conveys nonpublic
information to him and improperly breaches a fiduciary or fiduciary-like
duty of trust and confidence to the shareholder. 12 4 Liability will attach
when a tipper breaches his/her fiduciary duty by providing material
nonpublic information leading to the conclusion that the tippee knew, or
should have known, of the breach. 12 5
There are allegations that Mr. Cohen received nonpublic information
from those at his firm who have already been indicted.126 The caveat is that
only those insiders who were in the actual possession of the improperly
obtained information when they made insider trades are liable, and the facts
in the media do not indicate that Cohen was an a "actual or constructive
insider of the firms about which the information as received."l 2 7 One
potential solution to bring Cohen under some form of criminal liability
would be that he is a possible insider trading tippee, one who controlled
and financed the insider traders.1 2 8 However, Mr. Cohen did not always
121. Id. at 113.
122. Id. at 113.
123. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
124. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Willful Blindness, Plausible Deniability, and
Tippee Liability: SAC, Steven Cohen, and the Court's Opinion in Dirks, 15
TRANSACTIONS TENN. J. BUS. L. 47 (2013).
125. Christopher L. Garcia & Boyd M. Johnson III, DEFENDING CLIENTS IN INSIDER
TRADING INVESTIGATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, FROM DEFENDING
CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS CH. 13, 649, Daniel
Fetterman & Mark Goodman, Thomson West, 2012.
126. See, e.g., Kolhatkar, supra note 67.
127. Heminway, supra note 124, at 48.
128. Id.
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make the trades. The difficulty in connecting him is exacerbated by the fact
that others did the trading, and he basically congratulated them for a good
call.
For the breach of duty component of an insider trading action, the
prosecutor would have to establish that the tipper had a duty of trust which
included a duty not to disclose any material nonpublic information and not
engage in insider trading, that he or she breached this duty, that the tippee
knew that there was a duty, and that the tippee knew that the duty was
breached by supplying that information.1 2 9 With Mr. Cohen, it is not clear
that Mr. Martoma and others were sharing with him how they got their
information.
Under this framework, Mr. Martoma's case is instructive. If Mr. Cohen
knew, or should have known (based on prior experiences with Mr.
Martoma and his conduct), the origin of the information regarding the
Alzheimer's clinical trials, culpability could be established. It is again
difficult to establish that Mr. Cohen was aware that the people who shared
information with Mr. Cohen's employees breached duties of trust by
sharing information. From the information of the employees outlined
above, it is unlikely that Mr. Cohen had actual knowledge of any
informant's duty or breach. The issue becomes one of whether turning a
blind eye and denying constructive knowledge is the intent of these insider
trading provisions. The effect of the recent interpretation is that principals
and executives in a firm can stand back and witness phenomenal avoidance
of losses and spectacular gains with public events following shortly
thereafter and be able to claim no knowledge of direct inside information.
At some point, the duty of inquiry arises, and the culture issues play a part
in establishing knowledge.
In SEC v. Obus, the court held that an analysis of what a tippee should
have known involves "a fact specific inquiry turning on the tippee's own
knowledge and sophistication, and on whether the tipper's conduct raised
red flags that confidential information was being transmitted
improperly."o30 The court in United States v. Whitman noted that a remote
tippee's knowledge that the tipper was receiving some sort of benefit might
be difficult to prove.' 31 The court aptly .said that this "'loophole,' is a
product of the topsy-turvy like way the law of insider trading has
developed in the courts and cannot be cured short of legislation." 3 2
129. Id. at 49.
130. SEC v Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 288 (2d Cir. 2012).
131. United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), as corrected
(Nov. 19, 2012), aff'd, 555 F. App'x 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
132. Id.
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In reality, the manner in which securities laws are framed allows
"aware" traders to set up an operation in which they shield themselves from
liability. They can pay their fines, pay their employees' legal fees, and still
have a corporation left to manage their personal fortune. This appears to be
what has happened with SAC and Mr. Cohen. 13 3 Under this standard, the
congratulatory emails, such as those between Mr. Horvath and Mr. Cohen
on the Dell deal (for which he avoided $1.7 million in losses) and the
information provided by Mr. Martoma on the medical insider information,
show an awareness of phenomenal trades but not necessarily an awareness
of the sources of information used to make the market moves.1 34
XI. THE FUTURE OF SAC CAPITAL
As a result of the criminal settlement, SAC must cease its investment
advisor functions and will not be investing public money; instead, it is left
investing Mr. Cohen's large personal fortune under the name Point72 Asset
Management.' 3 1 In March 2014, the SAC website disappeared from the
Internet, and in its place was a page for Point72 Asset Management.' 36 A
disclaimer at the bottom of the new web page reminds visitors "Point72
Asset Management does not seek, solicit, or accept clients that are not
eligible as family clients." 3  Even if the SEC bans Mr. Cohen from the
securities industry, it will not impact his ability to trade his personal
fortune. 3 1
After announcing the criminal settlement, Bharara said,
Individual guilt is not the whole of our mission. Sometimes,
blameworthy institutions need to be held accountable too .... Today,
[SAC], one of the world's largest and most powerful hedge funds, agreed
to plead guilty, shut down its outside investment business, and pay the
133. Michael Rothfeld et al., SAC Capital's Steven Cohen Expected to Avoid
Criminal Charges, WALL ST. J. ( July 4, 2013, 11:35 PM), http://online.wsj.com/ne
ws/articles/SB10001424127887323899704578585953480399358 ("U.S. prosecutors
have concluded that they don't have enough evidence against hedge-fund billionaire
Steven A. Cohen to file criminal insider-trading charges against him before a July
deadline.").
134. Indictment, supra note 9, para. 32a.
135. Selena Maranjian, See What This Infamous Money Manager Has Sold, THE
MOTLEY FOOL (May 27, 2014), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/05/27/see-
what-this-infamous-money-manager-has-sold.aspx.
136. Point72 Asset Management, PolNT72, http://www.point72.com/ (last visited
May 29, 2015).
137. Id.
138. Sheelah Kolhatkar, SAC Capital to Pay $1.8 Billion, the Largest Insider
Trading Fine Ever, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com
/bw/articles/2013-11-04/sac-capital-to-pay-1 -dot-8-billion-the-largest-insider-trading-
fine-ever.
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largest fine in history for insider trading offenses. That is the just and
appropriate price for the pervasive and unprecedented institutional
misconduct that occurred here.' 3 9
In reality, the $1.2 billion settlement is less than the $1.3 billion Mr.
Cohen personally made last year. 14 0 Mr. Cohen's net worth was recently
reported at $9.4 billion, and it now appears that he will be left with a
sizable $7 billion fortune.1 4 1
Mr. Cohen will personally pay for the fine even though he still denies
personal wrongdoing.142 He privately complained that he had to pay over
$1 billion in fines for the actions of what he calls "rogue employees."l43 A
press release issued after the settlement by SAC read "[t]he tiny fraction of
wrongdoers does not represent the 3,000 honest men and women who have
worked at the firm during the past 21 years. SAC has never encouraged,
promoted or tolerated insider trading." 44 This statement angered federal
prosecutors because it conflicted with SAC's admission of guilt. SAC
offered a new statement that read. "Even one person crossing the line into
illegal behavior is too many and we greatly regret this conduct
occurred."l 4 5
A. Future Prosecution of Mr. Cohen
The door has not been shut to future prosecution of Mr. Cohen and
others as Bharara stated in the settlement agreement that the "agreement
today provides no immunity from prosecution for any individual." 4 6 In
2010, the government passed Section 1079A of the Dodd-Frank Act, which
extended the statute of limitations for financial crimes to six years from
five.1 4 7 As of this writing, Bharara has run out of time to bring criminal
139. Press Release, FBI New York Office, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces
Guilty plea Agreement with SAC Capital Management Companies (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2013/manhattan-u.s.-attorney-announces-
guilty-plea-agreement-with-sac-capital-management-companies.
140. Andre Damon, No Criminal Charges for Hedge Fund SAC Capital - Fined
$1.2 Billion for "Pervasive and Unprecedented" Insider Trading, GLOBAL RESEARCH
(Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.globalresearch.ca/no-criminal-charges-for-hedge-fund-sac-
capital-fined-1-2-billion-for-pervasive-and-unprecedented-insider-trading/5357O57.
141. Id.
142. See Kolhatkar, supra note 138.
143. Peter Latman & Ben Protess, SAC Capital Agrees to Plead Guilty to Insider
Trading, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2013, 11:06 AM), http://dealbook.ny
times.com/2013/11/04/sac-capital-agrees-to-plead-guilty-to-insider-trading/?_hp=true
&_type=blogs&_r-0.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Kolhatkar, supra note 138.
147. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
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charges against Mr. Cohen on the basis of his alleged conversation between
Mr. Cohen and Mr. Martoma and the subsequent illegal insider trades of
Elan and Wyeth occurred in July 2008.148 At a conference in July 2013,
Bharara confirmed that the Dodd-Frank Act enlarged securities limitations,
and he reiterated "we still have a lot of legal theories we can pursue."1 4 9
In 2013, there was speculation that prosecutors were considering the
possibility of racketeering charges, which carry lengthy prison sentences.150
Decades ago, in New York, when Rudy Giuliani held Bharara's position,
he brought racketeering charges against Princeton/Newport Limited
Partners.1 5 1
Further, the racketeering claims brought by Mr. Cohen's ex-wife Patricia
Cohen against Mr. Cohen were dismissed by a federal court in January
2014.152 In the divorce Ms. Cohen accused him of hiding assets which
were the product of insider trading.15 3 She was unable to provide enough
evidence to show that Mr. Cohen engaged in a pattern of insider trading,
bank fraud, and money laundering in violation of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act.1 54 She is still continuing with her separate
claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty and has been able to obtain
investors for her battle against Mr. Cohen.155
B. Administrative Action against Mr. Cohen
As of this writing, the only charges that have been laid against Mr.
Cohen personally are an administrative action pursuant to the Investment
Advisors Act 5 6 for failure to supervise his portfolio managers Mr. Martoma
and Mr. Steinberg.1 5 7 These are the same managers who have been
111-203, § 1079 A, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
148. See Fontevecchia, supra note 94.
149. Sheelah Kolhakar, Is the Government About to Move the Goal Posts on Steve
Cohen?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, (July 17, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/2013-07-17/is-the-government-about-to-move-the-goal-posts-on-steve-cohen.
150. Emily Flitter, Prosecutors consider using racketeering law against SAC:
source, REUTERS (May 21, 2013, 7:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article
/2013/05/21/us-saccapital-investigation-rico-idUSBRE94KlCD20130521.
151. John Cassidy, Has Steven Cohen Bought Off the US Government?, THE NEW
YORKER (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy
/2013/1 1/has-steven-a-cohen-bought-off-the-us-government.html.
152. Patricia Hurtado & Chris Dolmetsch, SAC's Cohen Wins Partial Dismissal of
Ex-Wife's Claims, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 27, 2014, 3:04 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2014-01-27/sac-s-cohen-wins-dismissal-of-ex-wife-s-fraud-claim.html.
15 3. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 18 U.S.C.§§ 1961-68.
157. SEC Proceeding, supra note 83.
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criminally charged and found guilty of insider trading.158 It has been
speculated that the worst possible outcome of this civil charge would be a
lifetime ban from the securities business.159 Because this action was filed
through an administrative proceeding, it will limit Mr. Cohen's right to
discovery. 16 0 There is some speculation that this was done to limit Mr.
Cohen's ability to prepare a better defense in any future criminal case. 16 1
The choice, in proceeding through administrative action, also affords the
case a lower burden of proof than a criminal case, providing for a potential
162
warm-up.
In the Order, Instituting Administrative Proceedings, the SEC alleges,
"Cohen received highly suspicious information that should have caused any
reasonable hedge fund manager in Cohen's position to take prompt action
to determine whether employees under his supervision were engaged in
unlawful conduct and prevent violations of federal securities law."l 6 3
Mr. Cohen appears to have taken the lesson to heart or at least to the
point of prevention. He has been seeking to hire former prosecutors and
others with government experience for the compliance function in his new
firm.164 Several FBI agents have already been hired.165
C. Shifting Prosecution Priorities
There have been shifting political winds and public pressures
surrounding the manner and frequency with which the DOJ charges and
prosecutes corporate defendants.166  The DOJ received a great deal of
public scrutiny for its failure to bring criminal charges against any financial
institutions for their role in the 2008 financial crisis, which only intensified
in the wake of their decision to pursue a deferred prosecution agreement
158. Id.
159. Matt Taibbi, Steve Cohen: The Feds Get Tough, Sort Of ROLLING STONE
(Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/steve-cohen-the-feds-get-
tough-sort-of-2013073 1.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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WALL. ST. J. (Dec. 18, 2013, 9:16 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001
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164. Matthew Goldstein, Cohen Seeks Law Experts for Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2014, at Bl.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Court E. Golumbic & Albert D. Lichy, The "Too Big to Jail" Effect
and the Impact on the Justice Department's Corporate Charging Policy, 65 HASTINGS
L.J. 1293 (2014).
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with HSBC in 2012.167 This scrutiny was not only coming from members
of the public but also members of Congress and media outlets."'
There is a possibility that another shift may be occurring-one that
would see the DOJ interested in ending the ability of a senior official to
foster a culture of corporate fraud and insider trading. Rajat Gupta of
Goldman Sachs was indicted for six criminal counts of insider trading, for
passing nonpublic information to Raj Rajaratnam.1 6 9 Federal prosecutors
denounced the culture of Galleon, the hedge fund Mr. Rajaratnam founded,
in which regular discussion included illegal tips.170 Janice Fedarcyk, the
FBI's Assistant Director in the agency's New York office, noted that "his
eagerness to pass along inside information to Mr. Rajaratnam is nowhere
more starkly evident than in the two instances where a total of thirty-nine
seconds elapsed between his learning of crucial Goldman Sachs
information and lavishing it on his good friend."17 1 He was convicted on
four of six charges, even though he was not accused of making any trades
himself. 72
The swath of insider trading cases that have emerged since Bharara's
installment actually began with Mr. Rajaratnam in 2009. 173 Mr.
Rajaratnam's Galleon Group, a hedge fund that at one time managed $3.7
billion dollars, was, for a time, the toast of Wall Street.1 74 He was charged
with securities fraud and with conspiracy to commit securities fraud.' 75 He
received the longest-ever term, eleven years, imposed in an insider-trading
167. Id.
168. Id. (detailing a look at the political backlash of DOJ's decision to defer
prosecution of HSBC); see also, Mark Gongloff, Obama Administration Essentially
Admits That Some Banks Are Too Big To Jail, Which Is Troubling, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/1 1/hsbc-too-big-to-jail n 2279439.html (last
updated Dec. 12, 2012, 9:23 AM) (highlighting media criticism of DOJ's corporate
prosecution policies).
169. Michael Rothfeld et al., Gupta Case Targets Insider Culture, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
27, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405297020368750457665
4872764778968.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. David Benoit, Rajat Gupta Guilty: By the Charges, WALL ST. J. (June 15,
2012, 3:17 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/06/15/rajat-gupta-guilty-by-the-
charges/.
173. See, e.g., Ben Protess & Matthew Goldstein, Preet Bharara's Wall St. Task
Force Has a Shifting Roster of Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2015, 6:42 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/02/1 6/preet-bhararas-wall-st-task-force-has-a-shift
ing-roster-of-lawyers/? r-0.
174. See Jenny Strasburg & Chad Bray, Six Charged in Vast Insider-Trading Ring,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1255
70373292090093.
175. Id.
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case.1 7 6 Mr. Rajaratnam's case involved a rags-to-riches story, similar to
Mr. Cohen's, that was colored by greed, fraud, and power. 17 7 The large
difference between Mr. Rajaratnam's case and Mr. Cohen's situation is the
presence of cooperating witnesses. A onetime Galleon employee
cooperated with prosecutors and taped conversations with Mr. Rajaratnam,
which led to more wiretaps.' 78 Prosecutors had wiretap recordings of Mr.
Rajaratnam actually collecting secrets from his sources. 7 9 Another
difference between the Galleon case and that of SAC is that many of the
co-accused testified against Mr. Rajaratnam and provided information
throughout the investigation.' 80 According to prosecutors, he gained $63.8
million throughout a seven-year conspiracy where he traded on inside
information from corporate executives, bankers, consultants, and traders.' 8 '
D. Who Is Accountable, How, and Why?
The defense of willful ignorance among CEOs and CFOs was gutted by
Sarbanes-Oxley ("SOX") because of the signature certification
requirements.182 The signature on the financial reports, when those reports
contain false information is now, in and of itself, a crime.'83 The purpose of
the signature requirement was to place responsibility on CFOs and CEOs
and to eliminate the "I didn't know" defense.' 84 Part of their jobs is to
vouch for the veracity of the financial statements.' 8 5 The market partially
bases its purchasing decisions and valuations on the risk CEOs and CFOs
incur: "In order for a certification signal to be credible, the certifying party
176. Susan Pulliam and Chad Bray, Trader Draws Record Sentence, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 14, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl000142405297020391430457
6627191081876286.
177. See, e.g., id.
178. Strasburg, supra note 174.
179. David Glovin et al., Rajaratnam Guilty in Insider-Trading Case, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESS (May 11, 2011, 5:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-
11/rajaratnam-is-found-guilty-of-all-counts-in-galleon-insider-trading-trial.html.
180. Id.
18 1. Id.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002); see also David Dayden, Why is Preet Bharara, the
'Scourge of Wall Street', taking a friendly tone towards mortgage bankers?, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 10 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/money/20
14/oct/10/preet-bharara-wall-street-defend-arrest-prosecute-bankers-crisis (explaining
the SOX rule and its impact on corporate prosecutions). Although a full discussion of
SOX is beyond the scope of this paper, generally the Act is designed to ensure the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures in securities law to protect investors.
183. Dayden, supra note 182.
184. What is Sarbanes-Oxley?, SOX-ONLINE, http://www.sox-online.com/whatis.
html (last visited May 29, 2015).
185. See id.
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must suffer a loss of reputation or incur legal sanctions if it is negligent,
colludes, or engages in other types of self-dealing."1 8 6
The willful ignorance defense has taken a beating beyond SOX because
the "who knew" defense has the same effect on the corporation or
organization as the loss of credibility in financial statements-trust is
dissipated. 187 The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine ("RCOD")
imposes risk on those who manage corporations through the imposition of
criminal liability on them for conduct that harms or endangers the public."'
This form of criminal liability for officers and directors results without
proof of knowledge, recklessness, or intent, the three usual foundations for
criminal responsibility. Initially, the RCOD was applied only in the health
care sector, but it has now expanded to all areas of law where the purpose
of the violated statute is public welfare.' 89 For example, environmental
protections, food safety, and industrial safety are all areas where there is
corporate officer accountability.1 90 Although much of the attention and
concern regarding the RCOD focuses on the health care sector, the doctrine
may also be used to enforce other public welfare statutes.
XII. THE CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE
Compared to the United States, Canada's approach to prosecuting insider
trading, and securities violations, is far less aggressive. In 2010, the
Ontario's Securities Commission ("OSC") took only four cases to court
and only two in 2009. It did not bring any in 2008.191 Nationwide, in
2010, Canadian provincial regulators concluded only thirteen insider
trading cases and enforced fines of merely $1.9 million.1 9 2 Differences in
prosecution rates may be directly related to how the regulators operate in
each country.
186. Manuel Utset, Fraudulent Corporate Signals: Conduct As Securities Fraud, 54
B.C. L. REv. 645, 659 (2013).
187. See id. (arguing, among other things, for the importance of corporate
credibility in financial statements).
188. Valorie Cogswell, Catching the Rabbit: The Past, Present, and Future of
California's Approach to Finding Corporate Officers Civilly Liable Under the
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 33 ENVIRONs ENvTL. L. & POL'Y J. 343, 345
(2009).
189. Andrew R. Ellis, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine: Sharpening a
Blunt Health Care Fraud Enforcement Tool, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 977, 980 (2013).
190. Id. at 979-80.
191. Martin Mittelstaedt, A World Of Difference On Insider Trading Prosecutions,
THE GLOBE AND MAIL, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/small-
business/sb-growth/a-world-of-difference-on-insider-trading-prosecutions/article 1360
483/ (last updated Aug. 23, 2012, 4:55 PM).
192. James H. Thompson, A Global Comparison of Insider Trading Regulations, 3
INT'L J. ACCT. & FIN. REP. 9 (2013).
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In the United States, the SEC is a national regulator, working in
cooperation with the DOJ and the FBI.1 9 3 In Canada, this same cooperation
is not available. There is no national regulator of the same scale, and each
province has their own provincial regulator tasked with regulating the
securities industry.194 The Canadian Securities Administrators exists as an
umbrella organization of the provincial regulators that seeks to harmonize
and coordinate regulation.' 9 5
Utpal Bhattacharya is an Associate Editor of the Review of Financial
Studies and the Journal of Financial Markets, and he was commissioned
by the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada.' 96 In his
report, he found that the SEC enforces securities laws on a much larger
scale,
[w]hen scaled by the size of the stock market, the SEC prosecutes 10
times more cases for all securities laws violations than the OSC
prosecutes, and 20 times more insider-trading violations. A detailed
examination of insider trading cases shows that the SEC resolves the
cases faster than the OSC, and fines 17 seventeen times more per insider
trading case than the OSC does.' 97
Incarceration is rarely sought in Canada, and prosecution is more likely
the option for the administrative tribunal set up by the Ontario Securities
Commission. 98
This difference in treatment comes from a stark difference in the law.
The OSC has a public interest jurisdiction.1 99 Insider trading requires the
accused to be in a special relationship with the company whose shares are
purchased or sold, and the accused must have knowledge of a material fact
or change about the firm that has not been generally disclosed 2 00 whereas,
in the United States, an accused is required to plead to breaching a specific
193. Mittelstaedt, supra note 191.
194. See id.
195. About CSA Overview, CANADIAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS,
https://www.securities-administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=45&linkidentifier-id&itemi
d=45 (last visited May 29, 2015).
196. Utpal Bhattacharya, Enforcement and its Impact on Cost of Equity and
Liquidity of the Market, (May 24, 2006), available at http://www.tfm
sl.ca/docs/V6(3)%2OBhattacharya.pdf (noting that the task force commissioned the
research study to help modernize securities legislation in Canada).
197. Id. at 137.
198. Mittelstaedt, supra note 191.
199. Proceedings, ONTARIO SECURITIES COMMISSION, http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/
About our-role-index.htm (last visited May 29, 2015). But See Mittelstaedt, supra note
191 (arguing the laws are not particularly different between the countries).
200. Penny Becklumb, Canada Business Corporations Act: Insider Trading, LAW
AND GOVERNMENT DIVISION, PARLIAMENT OF CANADA, http://www.parl.gc.ca/
content/lop/researchpublications/prb9938-e.htm (last updated Oct. 14, 2008).
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securities rule and provision of statute. In Canada, an accused may not
meet the strict definition of insider trading but could still receive and settle
a claim against him/her for acting contrary to the public interest.2 01
Canada only entered its first criminal conviction for illegal insider
trading on November 6, 2009, accepting a guilty plea from Stan
Grmovsek. 20 2 He and his co-accused started an illegal trading scheme after
their graduation from law school in 1994.203 He took nonpublic
information and made trades for a profit.204 As Emily Cole reports,
In Canada, Grmovsek was charged with three offences: (i) fraud (for
trades executed before the new Criminal Code insider trading
provisions), (ii) illegal insider trading contrary to the Criminal Code and,
(iii) money laundering contrary to the Criminal Code. In 2010, he was
sentenced to 39 thirty-nine months imprisonment by the Ontario Court of
Justice.205
As part of his plea agreement relating to a conspiracy to defraud charge
in the United States, Mr. Grmovsek agreed to disgorgement orders to the
SEC, a total of $8.5 million, with a waiver of all but nearly $1.5 million,
and he owed the OSC a total of $1.03 million, as well as $250,000 towards
the costs of the OSC investigation.206 With so few criminal convictions and
a fragmented regulation system, it is difficult to speculate how well
equipped Canadian regulators would be if they were forced to regulate a
Mr. Rajaratnam or Mr. Cohen-sized scheme.
CONCLUSION
Despite his host of legal problems, in March of 2014, Mr. Cohen
increased his investment in the game-maker "Zynga" which makes games
such as "FarmVille" and "Words with Friends."20 7 Mr. Cohen increased his
stake from 2.2 percent to 5.3 percent, making him the largest shareholder in
208Zynga. His stake in the company, valued at $173 million, is worth just
201. Proceedings, supra note 199.
202. Emily Cole, Canada's First Criminal Conviction for Illegal Insider Trading,
MILLER THOMPSON (2010), http://www.millerthomson.com/en/publications/newsletters
/securities-practice-notes/2010-archives/spring-2010/canadas-first-criminal-conviction-
for-illegal (last visited May 29, 2015).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Nick Summers, Troubled SAC Capital Doubles Its Stake in Troubles Zynga,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-
03-28/troubled-sac-capital-doubles-its-stake-in-troubled-zynga.
208. John Kell, Cohen's SAC Capital Increases Stake in Zynga, Fox BUSINESS
(Mar. 27 2014), http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2014/03/27/cohen-sac-capital-
increases-stake-in-zynga/.
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more than what Mr. Cohen paid for the 1932 Pablo Picasso painting "Le
Reve" he purchased in 2013.209 Goldman Sachs joined JPMorgan Chase &
Co. and Bank of America Corp in providing personal loans to Mr. Cohen
largely based on his art collection.2 10 Some note that many wealthy clients
seek art loans because they can keep the paintings at their homes while
"borrowing at rates as low as 2.5 percent." 2 11 Many agree that Mr. Cohen
had nominal punishments for the alleged infractions he has been a part of.
He continues to invest his personal fortune, and he continues to engage in
the very public promotion of his private fortune.
As Joan MacLeod Heminway concludes in her article on SAC, perhaps
this case is the reason to open the discussion on insider trading and what,
"the law of insider trading should be-and why-as a matter of policy. If
insider trading regulation and liability is to have any coherence in an era of
expert networks, we must address and resolve this question."212 If the
classic goals of the criminal law are for deterrence, retribution,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation, then it is questionable if some, or any of
211these goals, have been achieved in this situation. Mr. Cohen is not
personally suffering any of these consequences, and some would say that
he is flaunting his good fortune which remains largely intact. 2 14 Although
Mr. Cohen cannot invest public money, he has been keeping busy with his
private fortune.
Some have said that the charges against SAC were merely a result of the
inability of the government to collect enough evidence against Mr. Cohen
himself.215 However, destroying SAC might be the only way to attempt to
punish Mr. Cohen. In August of 2013, the last outside investor of SAC
pulled his support. 2 16 Ed Butowsky, the self-appointed "last man standing"
209. Summers, supra note 207.
210. Miles Weiss, Goldman Sachs Supports Cohen With Loan Backed By Fine Art,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (May 6, 2014, 9:47 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2014-05-06/goldman-sachs-supports-cohen-with-loan-backed-by-fine-art.html.
211. Id. (stating that Mr. Cohen had previously bought a sculpture of a shark in
formaldehyde for $8 million and that Mr. Cohen did sell some of his prized art
collection in 2013, including a Gerhard Richter painting "A.B. Courbet" for $26.5
million, and Andy Warhol's "Liz #1 (Early Colored Liz) for $20.3 million).
212. Heminway, supra note 124, at 58.
213. See, e.g., IT Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg & Tali Gal, Criminal Law Multitasking,
18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 893 (2014).
214. See, e.g. Taibbi, supra note 159 (detailing Cohen's decision to purchase an
$155 million Picasso and $60 million mansion within weeks of SAC's guilty plea. "It
was a big fat middle finger to the government, flipped by a man who clearly thought he
was getting away with a slap on the wrist.").
215. Golumbic, supra note 166, at 51.
216. Jenny Strasburg, SAC Loses One Of Its Most Loyal Investors, Money Beat,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 28, 2013, 4:05 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013
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with SAC, defended the company by noting "the government says SAC has
a culture of insider trading. What about a culture of working-my-a** off?
Because that's what they're doing at SAC."217 Questions still abound about
the culture of SAC, but the law, as it existed at the time of the prosecutions
and settlement, did not allow conviction based on culture. The law still
requires that direct nexus of insider to defendant in order to prove the
scienter element of insider trading.2 18
As with the SOX reforms that held CEOs and CFOs accountable through
their signatures on the financial statements, perhaps the time has arrived for
legislative action that requires CEO certification of compliance operations.
In other words, until there is some additional statutory supplement, insider-
trading convictions of corporations and CEOs will be elusive, absent the
cooperation, taping, and wire-tapping of subordinates. Accountability for
firm actions needs to be addressed in a manner not reliant upon the specific
proof requirements of insider trading.
Certification could include requirements for examination of the timing of
trading, periodic reviews of traders' accounts, and that supposed element of
"serendipity" that seems to be tolerated in a world of logarithms, betas, and
all things technical. That certification of review may be the answer to the
insider trading escape clause that allows those who profit to walk away
without criminal charges because, well, they knew nothing. The legislative
approach should be one of tackling: Should they have known? And how
can we measure that? If not, perhaps Mr. Cohen is the king of eluding
criminal conviction, not just the king of hedge funds.
/08/28/sac-loses-one-of-its-most-loyal-investors/.
217. Id. ("I'm not doing this for Stevie Cohen ... It's not like I go to bed with a
Stevie doll. It's more like, what the hell is going on in this world?").
218. See infra note 2.
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